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ON BEHALF OF THE PAGANS AND THE IDOLATERS: 
A RESPONSE TO BURRELL
William Hasker
In this comment I express my puzzlement about Burrell's employment of "the 
distinction," and request further clarification. I also discuss at some length 
his views concerning free will. I explain the libertarian view as I understand 
it and point out why his criticisms of it do not succeed. I sketch out his own 
view of created freedom, and raise certain questions concerning that view.
David Burell is owed our thanks for his challenging and provocative pa­
per. In responding to it, I hope in turn to provoke from him a response 
that will further advance the discussion between groups of philosophers 
who for convenience I will term "Thomists" and "analytic theists." Many 
times, sad to say, it proves impossible to bridge the gulf between contrast­
ing philosophical approaches in such a way as to allow for constructive 
dialogue, but it is my hope (and, I believe, David's as well) that this case 
will prove to be one of the exceptions. I will spend most of this comment 
responding to the second part of his paper, in which he discusses free will. 
But first I will say a little about the first part, in which the main theme is 
God's creation of the world.
We need, according to Burrell, a "radical transformation of standard 
philosophical strategies," in order to speak properly about God. Main­
stream analytic philosophy of religion has failed to see the need for this 
transformation, whereas the sort of Thomism espoused by Burrell does 
see the need and has gone a long way towards meeting it. Naturally, we 
need to hear more about this transformation. According to Burrell, it is 
made possible by attending to the divine creation of the world, and espe­
cially to "the distinction" between Creator and creatures. We need to be 
clear, then, about the nature of this distinction, and about what needs to 
be done in order to observe it properly. A natural place to look is Robert 
Sokolowski's book, The God of Faith and Reason,1 which Burrell repeatedly 
cites and praises in this and other writings. It was Sokolowski who coined 
the term "the Christian distinction" to refer to Christianity's perspective 
on God, creation, and the relation between them; Burrell later broadened 
this to include Muslim and Jewish theologies, and renamed it simply as 
"the distinction."2
It is doubtful, however, that Sokolowski gives us enough to clarify what 
Burrell has in mind. Sokolowski points out that Christianity, in opposition 
to all forms of paganism, makes the distinction between Creator and the 
created world fundamental to its understanding of reality. In elucidating 
the distinction, Sokolowski points out that on the Christian view there was
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a very real possibility that all the things in the world, and indeed the world 
as a whole, including ourselves, should never have existed. Furthermore, 
"we are to think of the possibility of things' not being, and of our own not 
being, in such a way that there is no less goodness or greatness—not 'in the 
world,' obviously, but 'there' at all."3 "God could and would be God even if 
there were no world. . . . To be God, God does not need to be distinguished 
from the world, because there does not need to be anything other than 
God alone."4 Still further, "God is not himself a competing part of nature 
or a part of the world."5 These are excellent and important statements, but 
they cannot do the job Burrell needs done, because they do not discrimi­
nate among Christian thinkers in the way he wants to do. All of the major 
philosophers in the tradition of analytic theism—Alston, Plantinga, Swin­
burne, and others—would agree with what Sokolowski has said here. To be 
sure, he goes on to elaborate the theme in terms of Thomistic metaphysics, 
but we do not receive the impression that he regards this particular meta­
physic as essential for a proper grasp of the Christian distinction. (To hold 
that this metaphysic is essential would imply a critical attitude towards ear­
lier Christian philosophers and theologians that is foreign to his intention.) 
In fact, there is little indication in Sokolowski's book of a motivation that is 
strong in Burrell, namely the desire to use "the distinction" as a cudgel with 
which to belabor other, less adequate, versions of Christian philosophy and 
theology. This is perhaps most evident in their very different assessments 
of Duns Scotus. For Burrell Scotus, by insisting on a univocal sense of "be­
ing" that applies both to creatures and to God, led us far along the road that 
ends in our speaking of an idol rather than of God. Sokolowski's very dif­
ferent assessment of Scotus is conveyed in the following statement: "There 
are figures, like Augustine, the Cappodocians, Aquinas, Scotus, and New­
man, who bring out the elementary issues of the faith with such force that 
they establish an intellectual age; one can hardly work with the Christian 
distinctions and identifications without taking the writings of such men 
into consideration, both as examples of the best that can be done and as 
expressions of the theological truth that is to be repeated."6
Perhaps, though, the denial of univocal predication, as applying both 
to human beings and to the divine, really is the key to "the distinction" 
as it is viewed by Burrell. (There is quite a bit in his article that might 
lead us to suspect that.) This may strike us as initially unpromising: Is the 
kingdom of heaven really founded on a doctrine of analogical predica­
tion? Still, grammar should not be sold short, as the Wittgensteinians will 
be quick to remind us. But there is a further problem here: the conception 
of analogy advocated by Burrell (and, according to him, by Aquinas) is so 
informal and apparently common-sensical that it's hard to see how it can 
be wielded as a cleaver to sever sound from unsound theology. There is no 
formal "theory of analogy" here, but rather the simple acknowledgment 
that all sorts of expressions frequently shift their meanings from context 
to context. Suppose Alston were convinced by Burrell, and abandoned his 
contention that there must be a univocal core underlying analogical predi­
cation. (Is it really wise, by the way, to patronize Bill Alston concerning the 
philosophy of language?) Would Alston then have to alter substantially 
any of his theological beliefs? I doubt that he would, and it doesn't seem 
that such a change could possibly have the import Burrell ascribes to "the
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distinction" — an import which, according to him, amounts to nothing less 
than the difference between true worship of God and idolatry.
There remains, however, the "dual linguistic rule" formulated by 
Kathryn Tanner. Is it here, finally, that we must look for a clear formu­
lation of the distinction? The first rule says that divine and non-divine 
predicates should be regarded neither as purely univocal nor as simply 
equivocal. True enough, but then hardly anyone would disagree (cer­
tainly not Alston); not many heretics are going to be caught in a net with 
a mesh this large. The second rule is to "avoid in talk about God's creative 
agency all suggestions of limitation in scope and manner. The second 
rule prescribes talk of God's creative agency as immediate and univer­
sally extensive." Here at last we have a formula with some bite to it, but 
surely more explanation is required. As it stands, it seems to imply that 
God's agency in the case of sinful human actions is exactly the same as 
for all other actions and events—but as we shall see, Tanner will have 
none of that. It is hard to see, though, how the needed explanations will 
not amount to some "limitation in scope and manner" of God's creative 
agency. Until the required explanations have been given Tanner's rule can 
perhaps function as a slogan to rally around, but certainly not as a precise 
definition of "the distinction."
Admittedly I have not in these few pages canvassed everything Burrell 
has said that might conceivably be relevant; I have, however, tried to focus 
on what seemed the most promising possibilities. So I will close this sec­
tion of my comment with an appeal to David Burrell: If "the distinction" is 
as important as you say it is, don't you have a moral obligation, as well as 
a professional responsibility, to explain to us exactly what it is, and what 
must be done in order to observe it properly?
We turn, now, to Burrell's discussion of free will, a discussion which 
does not, however, leave the theme of creation behind. On the contrary: 
true free will is best described as "created freedom," a conception which 
is contrasted with the libertarian view of free will Burrell finds established 
among analytic theists, and which he pillories with considerable energy 
and enthusiasm. So we need answers to the following questions: What 
does Burrell understand the libertarian view to be? Why does he find it 
so conspicuously unsatisfactory? What does he offer in its place? I have 
to say, however, that I do not find it easy to determine from his paper the 
answers to these questions. At times I find myself straining to discern, 
through a thick fog of rhetoric, the philosophical points Burrell is trying to 
make. I hope, nevertheless, to have found some markers that will serve to 
guide us through the fog, but it will not be entirely surprising if at certain 
points I have strayed off the path of his thought. At the very least, I hope to 
set out clearly what I take him to be saying; if and when I have gone astray, 
I trust that my errors will be corrected with at least equal clarity.
What, according to Burrell, is libertarian free will? I believe it will be 
helpful if we take as a key his reference to Roderick Chisholm's descrip­
tion of the free agent as an "Aristotelian prime mover." Burrell notes that 
Chisholm's use of this phrase fails to correspond accurately with Aristot­
le's own meaning, but he seems oblivious of the fact that it also seriously 
distorts the libertarian conception of free will. The notion is most illumi­
nating when it is contrasted with Burrell's notion of the will as responding
200 Faith and Philosophy
to "the lure of the good." "Human agents," he tells us, "cannot but act for 
'the good,' however distortedly they may perceive it. We have no choice 
about that; but the very indeterminacy of 'the good,' reflected in inher­
ently analogous uses of "good", assures that such an inbuilt orientation 
can in no way determine us to a single course of action. Quite the contrary, 
that very indeterminacy opens us up to countless possibilities, so provid­
ing the ground for rational choice." To which I respond, Bravo! Well said! 
We always act for a motive of some kind-som ething that is in some way 
desired, and thereby perceived as good, as desirable. But there are a great 
many different things, and different kinds of things, that we may perceive 
as desirable, even within a single situation. Furthermore (I would add) 
in some situations our desires for the different sorts of goods that may 
be available to us do not present themselves to us in a fully determinate 
"rank order"; rather, it is we ourselves who determine, within the situation, 
what it is we most desire. We do have some control, though not unlimited 
control, over the relative strengths of our various desires; one way we do 
this is by voluntarily directing our attention in this way rather than that. 
We reinforce our perseverance in a difficult task by dwelling upon the 
goods to be realized by its accomplishment, and we steel ourselves against 
temptation by deliberately banishing from our minds the thought of the 
pleasure that would result from a course of action we have recognized as 
being wrong or otherwise defective. (And of course, we may attempt to do 
either of these things, and fail in the attempt; that is an important ingredi­
ent in "weakness of will.")7
So far, I take myself to be saying things that are in agreement with Burrell's 
account of the will as responding to the lure of the good. (I postpone for 
now what he says about evil actions.) I do not believe, furthermore, that 
anyone can reasonably take exception to my describing the view I have set 
forth as libertarian. Why, then, does Burrell take himself to be expounding 
an alternative to libertarian free will? I believe the answer lies in the notion 
that is suggested by Chisholm's phrase, "a prime mover, itself unmoved." 
Almost incredibly, Burrell seems to think that the libertarian view entails 
that a free choice is one that is not moved by the desire for any good at all! This 
accounts for his use of the metaphor of "self-goosing," which is indeed 
excessively crude but which also thoroughly distorts the libertarian view 
it professes to characterize. I can only say that this entire line of criticism 
rests on a profound misconception; no one who understands the libertar­
ian view can possibly find the criticism anywhere near on target.8
This is not, however, Burrell's only criticism of the libertarian view, and 
in fact it is probably not his main objection to the view. His most trenchant 
criticism is that the libertarian view removes free creatures from the activity of 
the creator, thus in effect "denying the universal scope of creation." This, 
he says, is an "essentially Mu'tazalite" view, refereeing to an early school 
of Islamic thought that was discredited in consequence of the relentless 
determinism embraced by Sunni Islam. (Clearly, one benefit of Burrell's 
study of Islamic thought is that it provides him with a whole new battery 
of heresies of which he can accuse his theological opponents!) But what 
precisely is the force of this charge?
In order to bring this out, I will now characterize more fully the sort 
of theistic libertarian view Burrell is criticizing. We suppose, then, that
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someone is making a choice between two alternative courses of action. 
(Burrell seems somewhat averse to talking about choice, but I suppose he 
will agree that it does occur in human experience!) She is drawn to each of 
these alternatives by the lure of some good she envisages as resulting from 
it. The agent is a creature of God; she is a small part of a universe which 
in its totality was freely created by God ex nihilo. God continually sustains 
her in being; without this continual divine action she would instantly col­
lapse into nothingness. Furthermore, in sustaining her God sustains her 
causal powers, including the power to make choices such as the one that 
now lies before her. When she does choose, God adds his "concurrence" 
to her decision, enabling it to be carried out.9 Now, will Burrell agree that 
this account meets his objection concerning the "universal scope of cre­
ation"? If he does agree, I shall be delighted—but also greatly surprised. 
My prediction is that he will not agree to this, but why not? The answer 
is evident: because the decision as to which act is chosen is made by the human 
agent and not by God. This means, however, that the doctrine of creation, as 
interpreted by Burrell, entails that human actions are "created by God" in 
the sense that God, and God alone, determines which actions shall be performed. 
But once we see this clearly, it is evident that the doctrine of creation has 
been highjacked, stolen away and given a new meaning that is in no way 
implied in the original intention of the doctrine. A doctrine which is, as 
Burrell rightly states, the common possession of Christians, Muslims, and 
Jews has been appropriated in the interests of a strict theological deter­
minism which has never been more than a minority view among Chris­
tians and Jews, and is rejected also by many Muslims; all who do not agree 
are judged to be pagans! It would be difficult to think of a more blatant 
example of theological imperialism!
Burrell is less explicit in setting out his own alternative to the lib­
ertarian view; here we must rely mainly on hints and allusions. He 
appeals to Kathryn Tanner's description of divine transcendence as "non­
contrastive"; this apparently means, in this context, that the claim that 
the human agent decides which of two courses to follow is not to be set 
in contrast with the claim that it is God who so decides. Yet it is perfectly 
clear which of the two "decidings" takes precedence over the other; as 
Tanner herself says, "Given God's infallible working, human beings must 
choose when and what God wills."10 This is as clear a statement of theo­
logical determinism as anyone could wish for, in spite of the fact that both 
Tanner and Burrell dislike the word "determinism."11 (Objecting to one's 
opponent's choice of terminology can sometimes seem to be a rather trans­
parent strategy for avoiding discussion of a topic one dislikes.) The idea is 
that since God is creator, and thus on a "different level" from the human 
agent, the fact that it is ultimately God who decides what the human being 
shall do in no way detracts from her freedom "on the creaturely level."
But what shall be said about actions that are evil and sinful? Here Burrell 
has some interesting things to say. "The good," he observes, "draws us on 
and empowers our choices by giving them a proper telos." But this means 
that "malicious actions are such because they . . . bypass or run counter to 
this orientation as we refuse to let ourselves be engaged by it." And this in 
turn means that "by running counter to the inbuilt orientation by virtue of 
a refusal, evil actions can only be considered less than full-blown actions."
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This needs to be carefully considered. It does not seem to be true, in gen­
eral, that a morally wrong action is not lured or "drawn on" by some 
envisioned good. In a great many cases, the good that one seeks to attain 
through wrong-doing is all too palpable-enjoyment, economic security, 
freedom from fear and anxiety, release of painful psychic tensions-and is 
of a sort that, under different circumstances, it might be entirely right and 
appropriate for us to pursue. It is quite true, however, that in performing 
a morally wrong action we are neglecting the kind of good that in that 
particular situation is most important, the kind that it is incumbent on us, 
in that situation, to pursue. And in that sense, such an action is indeed de­
fective; it falls short of what an action ought to be. Whether such an action 
is thereby also ontologically defective, so that it is "less than a full-blown 
action," seems to me dubious, but I will not pursue that point here.
Burrell, however, seeks to exploit this point to sharpen his critique of 
libertarianism: "It is primarily malicious actions which display the marks 
of 'libertarian freedom,' yet do so by refusing the dynamics of orientation 
to the good. So it seems odd to regard freedom so construed as paradig­
matic for human free action." This, frankly, is rather strange. Who is it 
that regards sinful actions as paradigmatic? No one that I can think of! 
Perhaps what Burrell has in mind is that morally wrong and sinful actions 
are often cited in showing the need for a libertarian view, because they 
bring to the fore both the responsibility of the agent and the importance of 
not making God responsible-of not making God the "author of sin." But 
of course, morally good actions are equally good examples of actions that 
are free in the libertarian sense, as are many actions in which moral right 
and wrong are not concerned at all. It is a fault of some presentations of 
the libertarian view that they focus exclusively on actions which involve 
a choice between moral good and evil, and either imply or state outright 
that libertarian freedom manifests itself only in such situations. On the 
contrary, there are many other kinds of choices-m any of those involved 
in artistic creation, for exam ple-in  which there is no question of moral 
right and wrong but which nevertheless involve diverse goods between 
which the agent must freely decide.
But to return to Burrell's account of malicious actions, what shall be said 
about the origination of such actions? At this point I offer an interpretation 
that goes beyond what Burrell explicitly says, an interpretation which is, 
therefore, very much open to correction by him. His account seems to be 
an adaptation of the notion of evil as privatio boni, and is suggestive of 
Augustine's remark that sinful actions do not have an efficient cause, but 
rather a "deficient cause." This means that we cannot and should not look 
for an identifiable cause of sinful actions; this is the "surd of sin," in the 
expression borrowed from Lonergan. In this way we avoid ascribing sin to 
God as its cause, without having to resort to a libertarian account. A little 
dialectical probing, however, reveals the weakness of this defense. Take the 
case of a particular sinful action. We ask, if God had willed that the agent 
should act virtuously rather than sinfully, and had given her the gracious 
assistance enabling her to do so, would she not have acted virtuously? Ev­
idently, the answer is Yes, she would. But further: given that God does not 
supply such assistance, was it inevitable that she should act sinfully? The 
answer, once again, must be Yes, otherwise multiple disasters threaten: it
A RESPONSE TO BURRELL 203
would then be the case that it is the agent herself who determines whether 
or not she would sin, and it would also be the case that she is able to 
act virtuously without the assistance of divine grace—in other words, we 
should have not only libertarianism but Pelagianism. But given these two 
admissions, to deny that God is the author of sin can be little more than a 
semantic evasion. God's causal contribution to a sinful action may not be 
the same as to a virtuous action; that much is true enough. But God, by 
placing the agent in a situation in which she is required to act virtuously, 
and at the same time declining to provide her with the grace that would 
enable her to do so, guarantees that she will sin; indeed he necessitates her 
sinning. I do not know whether Burrell will accept this conclusion or not; 
if not, I shall be most interested to see how he manages to avoid it.
It is interesting to see how Burrell's ally Kathryn Tanner responds to 
this difficulty. Given her premises, it would seem that God's creative will 
must be directly behind the conj unction of circumstances that leads to a 
person's sinning. But this, as she rightly sees, "conflicts with the premise 
of God's goodness,"12 and cannot be accepted. And on the other hand, 
God's creative will cannot be that she should refrain from sinning, other­
wise her actual sin would render that will fallible. In order to avoid both 
of these unacceptable consequences, Tanner must hold that God's creative 
intention includes neither the intention that the person sin, nor the inten­
tion that she refrain from sinning. Rather, God's intention consists of sets 
of subjunctive propositions, "propositions, that is, about what else will 
happen in the world should the creature sin, and what will happen within 
the world should the creature not."13 This has the result of "multiplying, 
perhaps indefinitely, the outcomes that may conform to God's will for the 
world."14 This does not, however, mean that God's will to save human 
beings is subject to failure: "The sinners' intentions are taken up within 
the intention of God for the world and are inevitably redirected to the end 
God wills, in virtue of the fact that God's will is directly efficacious of ev­
erything else in the world besides sin and the fact that God can always will 
with the same necessary efficacy that a sinner's heart be transformed."15 
This seems to me to be a remarkable combination of some deterministic el­
ements with emphases more at home within a libertarian view, all brought 
to an optimistic conclusion in a doctrine of universal salvation. While I 
am formulating my wish list, I would very much like to know Burrell's 
opinion of these views of Tanner's!
In this comment I have expressed my genuine puzzlement about 
Burrell's employment of "the distinction," and have discussed at some 
length his views concerning free will. I have explained the libertarian 
view as I understand it and have pointed out why his criticisms of it do 
not succeed. I have also sketched out, as best I could, his own view of cre­
ated freedom, and have raised certain questions concerning that view. It is 
my hope that in his response he will clarify further his own view, where 
that is needed, and will bring to a focus his objections to the ideas that are 
typical of the analytic mainstream in philosophy of religion. We pagans 
and idolaters, it seems to me, are owed that much!
Huntington University
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NOTES
1. The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982).
2. I find myself wondering whether Burrell can afford to be as comfort­
able as he seems to be with the Islamic notion of shirk, the heresy of “asso­
ciating the creature with God." Isn't that notion formulated, at least in part, 
precisely in order to condemn the worship of Jesus by Christians? As stated 
on a poster carried in a demonstration: “Jesus was a Muslim prophet, not the 
Son of God."
3. Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 32.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
5. Ibid., p. 36.
6. Ibid., p. 28.
7. Further discussion of this aspect of libertarian free will may be found 
in chapter 11 of my Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (London: Rout- 
ledge, 2004), and in chapter 6 of The Triumph of God Over Evil (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008).
8. I do not believe that Chisholm himself understands the phrase in the 
way I am objecting to. His meaning can perhaps best be captured by adding 
a gloss: “prime mover, itself unmoved by any sufficient cause." (See his discus­
sion of motives that “incline but do not necessitate" in Person and Object: A 
Metaphysical Study (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), p. 69.))
9. Actually the need for a distinct divine act of concurrence is contro­
versial; I include it here in order to present Burrell with the richest possible 
theistic account of libertarian choice.
10. Kathryn Tanner, “Human Sin, Human Freedom, and God the Creator," 
in The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. 
Tracy (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 
pp. 111-35; quotation from p. 127.
11. Following Richard Taylor, I take determinism to be “the general philo­
sophical thesis which states that for everything that ever happens there are 
conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen" (“Determin­
ism," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 359). Theological determinism 
is determinism in which the relevant conditions have to do with the will and 
decrees of God.
12. Tanner, p. 132.
13. Ibid., p. 133. Tanner actually calls these “pseudosubjunctive" proposi­
tions, but this is an unnecessary refinement; the propositions are subjunctives 
pure and simple.
14. Ibid., p. 134.
15. Ibid., p. 135. For my own comments on Tanner's views, see my “God 
the Creator of Good and Evil?" in The God Who Acts, pp. 137-46.
